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This paper studies the process by which a change in the institutional logic of an organisational field 
diffuses through the management control system of a firm. The theoretical framework proposed by 
Hasselbladh  and  Kallinikos  (2000)  enables  us  to  describe  the  institutionalisation  process  of 
management control systems in more detail by observing how ideals are translated into discourses 
and  control  techniques.  We  argue  that  both  the  process  by  which  institutional  changes  are 
implemented inside organisations and the process of decoupling are two aspects of the same issue. 
Revisiting  core  notions  of  new-institutional  theory  such  as  internalisation  and  decoupling,  our 
findings  question  the  systematic  as  well  as  the  linear  nature  of  the  institutionalisation  process. 
Empirical findings, based on a field study conducted in the French subsidiary of a pharmaceutical 
laboratory, highlight how the discourses of organisational actors contradict new ideals and control 
techniques. More particularly, it appears that, when a discourse cannot be heard, it can be partly 
bypassed  using  techniques.  It  is  also  argued  that  intra-organisational  change  builds  on  stable 
discourses and ambivalent technology, which foster insidious dissemination of the new institutional 
logics when “what can be done cannot be said”.  
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1. Introduction 
Neo-institutional research has demonstrated the importance of studying institutional factors, as well 
as traditional economic factors, in order to understand why Management Control Systems (MCS) 
change (Covaleski and Dirsmith, 1988; Abernethy and Chua, 1996; Granlund and Lukka, 1998; 
Brignall and Modell, 2000; Burns and Scapens, 2000; Collier, 2001; Modell, 2001).  
In this paper, we draw on New Institutional Sociology (NIS) to address the issue of change in 
management control. We thus rely on a sociological and organisational approach to change (rather 
than on more functional economic views) and account for change through the institutionalisation 
process of new MCS. For us, NIS is a relevant framework because it enables us to show that MCS 
changes are driven mainly by institutional factors and not only by efficiency motives (Granlund, 
2001). It underlines that organisations adopt MCS to appear well-managed and to be legitimated in 
their organisational field (Covaleski et al., 1996). Therefore, NIS invites us to consider MCS as 
vectors  as  well  as  targets  of  change.  Moreover,  this  perspective  does  not  imply  any  moral 
judgement  regarding  change,  being  associated  with  neither  progress  nor  regression  (Burns  and 
Vaivio, 2001).  
However, NIS does not provide a perfect and absolutely critique-proof framework for studying 
MCS change. NIS focuses on dissemination models, remaining at a macro level (Hasselbladh and 
Kallinikos,  2000),  and  does  not  really  explain  the  process  by  which  institutional  changes  are 
implemented within organisations (Siti-Nabiha and Scapens, 2005). The effects of change through 
the  MCS  are  also  widely  debated  in  this  perspective.  NIS  theorists  originally  considered  that 
institutional constraints were satisfied by decoupling the activity as it was presented externally from 
the activity as it really occurred (Meyer and Rowan, 1977), and conceived decoupling as a largely 
inherent attribute of institutionalised practices and organisations (Modell, 2003). In this perspective, 
the MCS are implemented to satisfy institutional demands and should not interfere with day-to-day 
activity in the organisation (Carruthers, 1995). On the one hand, some studies identify various 
decoupling phenomena (Ansari and Euske, 1987; Fernandez-Revuelta Perez and Robson, 1999; 
Siti-Nabiha and Scapens, 2005). On the other, Covaleski and Dirsmith (1988) deny any ability to 
decouple the MCS from the day-to-day activity because of their structuring impact. The question of 
decoupling  has  to  be  tackled  to  improve  our  understanding  of  change  in  a  neo-institutional 
perspective.  
In this paper, we consider that both the process by which institutional changes are implemented 
inside organisations and the process of decoupling are two aspects of the same issue. Both require 
an in-depth analysis of the problem of institutionalisation of MCS inside the organisation (Collier, 
2001;  Siti-Nabiha  and  Scapens,  2005).  Indeed,  the  institutionalisation  refers  to  both  the 
implementation  and  the  internalisation  of  new  practices  (Kostova  and  Roth,  2002)  and 
institutionalisation cannot be completed in the event of decoupling (Meyer and Rowan, 1977). By 
analysing the process of institutionalisation carefully, we try to explain in depth what change is 
(Quattrone and Hopper, 2001). More precisely, this research endeavours to answer the following 
question: How is change in a given organisational field institutionalised in a management control 
system of a given firm? 
To  respond  to  our  research  question,  we  observe  the  institutionalisation  process  of  a  new 
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in this sector seem to be changing their development strategies and are turning to modes of selling 
similar to those of the fast moving consumer goods industry (Panigyrakis and Veloutsou, 1999; 
Moss and Schuiling, 2003). This change characterises a new institutional logic in the sector, which 
may be driven by efficiency expectations but also by institutional factors (Scott et al., 2000). In 
order to provide an in-depth understanding of the institutionalisation process at a micro level, our 
research  deals  with  one  firm:  Antalgyx.  More  precisely,  we  analyse  how  this  laboratory  has 
imported and incorporated MCS from the consumer goods industry. The case study is analysed 
from the angle of NIS. The theoretical framework of Hasselbladh and Kallinikos (2000) is used to 
understand changes resulting from the diffusion of the “consumer goods” logic in Antalgyx. As 
suggested by these authors, we carefully study the ideals, discourses and techniques that deal with 
the diffusion of the institutional logic inside the organisation. Responding to criticism that a more 
comprehensive  MCS  should  be  studied  (Otley,  1980),  this  study  investigates  a  combination  of 
controls including cultural, behavioural and output controls (Merchant, 1982; Merchant and Van der 
Stede, 2003). Three elements are specifically analysed: the management culture, the division of 
powers amongst the departments, and the principles of accountability (Abernethy and Chua, 1996). 
Our empirical study shows that the process of institutionalisation is neither as systematic nor as 
linear as the theory suggests.  
This research highlights decoupling phenomena, meaning that change does not always substantially 
modify  the  daily  activity  of  organisational  actors.  In  our  case  study,  change  is  either  slowly 
implemented  or  rejected  by  actors,  or  ceremonially  accepted,  depending  on  the  element  of  the 
management control system under consideration. The decoupling of MCS can be an organisational 
response to institutional demand but also an attempt developed by internal coalitions to resist the 
new logic (Townley, 1997; Basu et al., 1999; Burns and Scapens, 2000; Major and Hopper, 2005). 
Whatever  its  causes  (if,  in  fact,  there  are  any),  the  decoupling  of  MCS  reminds  us  that 
organisational change stems from stability (Feldman, 2000; Feldman and Pentland, 2003). Indeed, 
in the pharmaceutical sector, stable practices conflicting with new ideals and techniques enable 
actors to cope with the evolution of their organisational field.  
Indeed, according to Hasselbladh and Kallinikos (2000), the institutionalisation process is supposed 
to build on a new ideal that develops into discourses and then techniques. However, our findings 
show that the process of change is not as linear as presented. Ambiguous coexisting ideals can give 
birth to new discourses and techniques (all the more so when new ideals are sufficiently ambiguous 
to appear as non-conflicting with the former ideals). Moreover, when a discourse dealing with the 
new logic cannot be heard by organisational actors, this does not prevent control techniques that are 
coherent with the new ideal from developing, meaning that organisational taboos can be bypassed 
by techniques. However, our empirical findings suggest that the institutionalisation is not completed 
whilst ever ideals, discourses and techniques are not coherent. In this respect, we give an empirical 
echo to a core NIS notion: the need for internalisation
1 to enable intra-organisational change to 
develop fully. When ideals, discourses and techniques do not form a coherent and linear whole, as 
stated  above,  objectification,  i.e.  the  visible  side  of  the  institutionalisation  process,  can  occur. 
                                                 
1 As NIS states, for an institutionalisation process to be completed, there is a need for internalisation (Kostova and Roth, 
2002). New logics have to be objectified, but objectification does not exhaust institutionalisation (Hasselbladh and 
Kallinikos, 2000, p.712). A more invisible side of institutionalisation lies in the internalisation of these new logics by 
organisational actors, meaning the way actors understand their roles and enact them according to, against, or regardless 
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However, in this case, subjectification, i.e. the invisible side of the institutionalisation process, is 
hindered.  
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. In the next section, we highlight the relevance 
of NIS to analyse organisational change and the role of management control systems in this respect. 
Then, we describe our research and data-gathering method. Sections 4 and 5 expose the case study 
background  and  our  findings  regarding  the  institutionalisation  of  a  new  logic  in  MCS  in  one 
pharmaceutical firm. Finally, the last section will be devoted to the discussion. 
2. Institutionalisation and Change  
Management control researchers have called upon NIS for almost twenty years to understand the 
development of control systems (Ansari and Euske, 1987; Covaleski and Dirsmith, 1988; Ansari 
and Bell, 1991; Covaleski et al., 1993; Abernethy and Chua, 1996; Alam, 1997; Hoque and Hopper, 
1997; Brignall and Modell, 2000; Collier, 2001; Sponem, 2004; Major and Hopper, 2005). These 
research  papers  share  the  postulate  that  “organisations  compete  not  just  for  resources  and 
customers,  but  for  political  power  and  institutional  legitimacy,  for  social  as  well  as  economic 
fitness” (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983). This search for legitimacy may push companies to adopt 
organisational  structures  and  practices  for  a  “ceremonial”  purpose  rather  than  for  the  rational 
purpose  of  improving  efficiency  (Meyer  and  Rowan,  1977).  This  leads  us  to  consider  that 
accounting  and  control  systems  are  also  “ceremonial”  tools  and  the  product  of  a  cultural 
rationalisation (Covaleski et al., 1996). 
The NIS framework suffers from its macro view of diffusion processes. However, NIS is very 
useful to understand changes that cannot be explained merely by efficiency motives. Our purpose is 
to contribute to this theoretical stream by providing a better understanding of the institutionalisation 
process  inside  organisations  based  on  the  framework  proposed  by  Hasselbladh  and  Kallinikos 
(2000). 
Analysing organisational change: NIS contributions and shortcomings 
To  understand  organisations  and  their  evolutions,  NIS  invites  us  to  go  beyond  traditional 
approaches  that  consider  an  organisation  as  merely  an  aggregation  of  technical  flows  or  as  a 
production  system  (Scott  and  Meyer,  1991).  In  addition  to  this  “technical  environment”,  NIS 
proposes taking the “institutional environment” into account, meaning the legal or cultural rules and 
obligations to which organisations are subject (Scott and Meyer, 1991). According to NIS, actors 
and organisations develop shared systems of meanings within an organisational field (i.e. the “sets 
of organisations that, in the aggregate, constitute an area of institutional life; key suppliers, resource 
and product consumers, regulatory agencies, and other organisations that produce similar services 
or products” (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983)). These collective beliefs are then objectified and thus 
“constitute  social  reality”  (Greenwood  et  al.,  2002),  creating  institutional  logics  (i.e.  sets  of 
“material practices and symbolic constructions which constitute organising principles and which are 
available  to  organisations  and  individuals  to  elaborate”  (Friedland  and  Alford,  1991)). 
Organisations are thus shaped according to the rules that are imposed on them, the expectations of 
the environment, and the cognitive patterns of the actors (Scott, 2001). 
An institutionalised structure can be defined as a structure “that has become taken for granted by 
members of a social group as efficacious and necessary” and that “generate action” (Tolbert and 
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processes –coercive, mimetic, and normative– through which institutional logics are diffused within 
organisations. Institutional logics can change by a process of de-institutionalisation, theorisation, 
diffusion, and re-institutionalisation (Greenwood et al., 2002). Thus, NIS gives us insights into how 
inter-organisational change diffuses, but little is known about intra-organisational change. As stated 
by Tolbert and Zucker (1996), we lack details on how the process of institutionalisation occurs 
inside organisations. NIS postulates that “actors become voluntarily isomorphic to [institutions] or 
that the institutions mould them involuntarily with little resistance” (Quattrone and Hopper, 2001).  
Therefore, NIS studies are criticised for seeing the process of institutionalisation as a linear and 
inescapable phenomenon and for not looking at the way in which norms are imposed, or not, inside 
the  organisation.  In  the  very  least,  “there  has  been  surprisingly  little  attention  given  to 
conceptualizing and specifying the process of institutionalisation” (Tolbert and Zucker, 1996). By 
focusing  on  the  analysis  of  dissemination  models,  the  empirical  programme  of  this  school  of 
thought  may  not  account  for  the  institutionalisation  process.  This  process  is  disembodied  and 
depersonalised (Hasselbladh and Kallinikos, 2000). In recent years, a number of papers have tended 
to address this deficit by studying these very processes of change (Dacin et al., 2002). However the 
institutionalisation  process  is  still  misunderstood  and  “institutionalization  needs  to  abandon  the 
bird’s eye view of the field, and come closer to the social and cognitive means and procedures 
underlying rationalized beliefs and schemes of action” (Hasselbladh and Kallinikos, 2000). This 
implies observing whether or not and the manner in which changes are translated into practices, and 
therefore investigating coupling and decoupling phenomena.   
Coupling, loose coupling and decoupling 
In  the  seminal  paper  of  Meyer  and  Rowan  (1977)  there  is  an  ambiguity  about  what 
institutionalisation is “because the definition of ‘institutionalised’ itself contradicts the claim that 
institutional  structures  are  apt  to  be  decoupled  from  behaviour”  (Tolbert  and  Zucker,  1996). 
Abandoning the bird’s eye view and differentiating patterns of adoption of practices is useful to 
investigate empirically this inherent ambiguity (Kostova and Roth, 2002). Active adoption occurs 
when implementation (in behaviours and actions) and internalisation (when the employees view the 
practice as valuable and become committed to the practice) are completed (Kostova and Roth, 
2002). In the opposite case, there is minimal adoption of a practice. When implementation occurs 
without internalisation, there is loose coupling or decoupling (Meyer and Rowan, 1977; Orton and 
Weick, 1990), and practices are adopted on a ceremonial basis (Meyer and Rowan, 1977; Kostova 
and Roth, 2002). 
In the field of management control, we may ask whether adopting new control practices is uniquely 
ceremonial  or  whether  it  entails  effective  changes  in  practices.  At  an  empirical  level,  several 
research papers highlight a decoupling phenomenon (Ansari and Euske, 1987; Fernandez-Revuelta 
Perez  and  Robson,  1999;  Siti-Nabiha  and  Scapens,  2005).  Conversely,  other  studies  reach  the 
conclusion that decoupling between the practices portrayed and internal working modes does not 
exist (Covaleski and Dirsmith, 1988; Basu et al., 1999). In a series of studies on the implementation 
of  control  systems  in  a  crèche,  a  university  and  a  hospital,  Covaleski  and  Dirsmith  show  that 
changes  in  the  control  mode  to  satisfy  the  external  environment  generally  have  an  impact  on 
internal management (Covaleski and Dirsmith, 1983, 1988; Covaleski et al., 1993). This can be 
explained by the structuring impact of MCS. Finally, Collier (2001) suggests that accounting can 
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evidence  highlights  the  need  for  research  into  how  the  decoupling  process  occurs  within 
organisations (Collier, 2001; Siti-Nabiha and Scapens, 2005).  
Moreover, organisations are not simple receptacles for institutional norms; they have a strategic 
capacity to react (Oliver, 1991). Townley (1997) shows that setting up performance appraisals (a 
“rational myth”) in universities in Great Britain depends on the capacities of these universities to 
contest the legitimacy of such measures. Major and Hopper (2005) demonstrate that the power of 
workers is also a major issue concerning the implementation of new management control systems. 
Basu et al. (1999) and Brignall and Modell (2000) suggest that the level of decoupling depends on 
the relative power of external elements and on the power of stakeholders.  In their case study, Siti-
Nabiha and Scapens (2005) observe that decoupling is not an organisational response to external 
pressures, but “the working out of a process of resistance to accounting change”. 
Stages of institutionalisation 
In the field of management control, studying the diffusion of a change through control systems is 
often better documented and dissemination processes are made more explicit than in organisation 
theory (for examples, see Ansari and Euske, 1987; Covaleski and Dirsmith, 1988; Covaleski et al., 
1993;  Abernethy  and  Chua,  1996;  Collier,  2001;  Siti-Nabiha  and  Scapens,  2005).  We  do  not, 
however, have a tool at our disposal that enables us to outline the institutionalisation process and 
the decoupling process is still poorly understood (Siti-Nabiha and Scapens, 2005). In this respect, 
the analytical device proposed by Hasselbladh and Kallinikos (2000) can be useful to understand 
the  institutionalisation  process  at  work  in  an  organisation.  They  suggest  studying  the 
institutionalisation  process  by  observing  the  ideals,  discourses  and  techniques  of  control 
(Hasselbladh and Kallinikos, 2000). Ideals, discourses and techniques of control are differentiated 
by their level of detail and accuracy and are mapped onto a continuum
2 (see Table 1). Therefore, 
“institutions are conceived as consisting of basic ideals that are developed into distinctive ways of 
defining and acting upon reality (i.e. discourse) supported by elaborate systems of measurement and 
documentation for controlling outcomes” (Hasselbladh and Kallinikos, 2000). 
<<Insert Table 1 about here>> 
The ideal refers to the institutional logic promoted inside the organisational field as already defined. 
A new ideal emerges mainly when events destabilise established practices (Greenwood et al., 2002). 
The  ideal  has  more  chance  of  developing  itself  if  it  can  be  embodied  in  a  firm  or  in  an 
organisational  field  that  constitutes  a  model  (Tolbert  and  Zucker,  1996).  Nonetheless,  conflict 
between actors’ rationalities can impede this diffusion (Townley, 2002). 
When ideals are developed and specified into elaborate systems of relationships and causal models, 
they are transformed into a discourse. A discourse is a way of defining and acting upon reality. It 
plays a central role in the institutionalisation process (Hasselbladh and Kallinikos, 2000). It is by 
means of discourses, and the elaborate systems of operations and techniques associated with them, 
that organisational goals and tasks are constructed. Discourses “single out a domain of application, 
define the relevant goals to be accomplished and the roles involved, spell out the criteria of truth 
and  designate  causal  theories  and  schemes  of  action  and  interpretation”  (Hasselbladh  and 
Kallinikos, 2000). 
                                                 
2 We differ from Hasselbladh and Kallinikos (2000) and the model they propose. For them, ideals refer to oral language, 
and discourse refers to written elements. We distinguish ideal from discourse by the level of precision rather than by the 
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Techniques  embody  discourse  when  it  institutionalises.  A  technique  is  an  elaborate  system  of 
measurement  and  documentation  for  controlling  action  outcome.  It  is  usually  expressed  in 
numerical or other forms of codification (Hasselbladh and Kallinikos, 2000). 
Finally, adopting a technique can remain a ceremonial act. The institutional process is completed 
when  internalisation  occurs  (Kostova  and  Roth,  2002).  In  other  words,  objectification  (i.e.  the 
articulation of ideals, discourses and techniques) is one side of the institutionalisation process that 
needs to be completed by subjectification (i.e. individuals’ enactment through role development) 
(Hasselbladh and Kallinikos, 2000, p.712). Therefore, the stages of an institutionalisation process 
can be schematised as presented in Figure 1. 
<<Insert Figure 1 about here>> 
We intend to use this framework to better understand organisational change. More precisely, this 
framework inspired by NIS is used in our paper as a device to analyse how inter-organisational 
change (new institutional logic in a given organisational field) can result in intra-organisational 
change  (institutionalisation  in  one  specific  firm  of  a  new  MCS  that  is  coherent  with  the  new 
institutional logic).  
3. Methodology 
In order to enrich understanding of the institutionalisation process of management control systems, 
we conducted a case study on the diffusion of a new institutional logic in one firm. Our case study 
is used as a tool for theory development, considering that a “single case can represent a significant 
contribution to knowledge and theory building” (Yin, 2003). We use the theory in a “very loose 
fashion to guide the research”, as proposed by Vaughan (1992). From this perspective, the data can 
contradict or reveal previously unseen inadequacies in the theoretical notions guiding the research, 
providing a basis for reassessment or rejection; the data can confirm the theory; and the data can 
force us to create new hypotheses, adding more detail to theory, more fully specifying it. This 
method of theory elaboration can appear self-contradictory (Vaughan, 1992): “On the one hand, the 
examination of the data with theory elaboration as the goal is seen as a major building block of a 
positivistic science. And on the other hand, [this methodology] is grounded in the work of Blumer 
and Glaser and Strauss”. Our approach, like Vaughan’s, differs from a positivistic tradition because 
testing and verifying are not part of our procedure. But it also differs from Glaser and Strauss’s 
position because we reject the assumption that a researcher begins with a clean slate. We argue that 
a researcher’s subjectivity is not a true problem, since “we are all producing orderliness in our 
writings,  sequences  of  relationships  […]  putting  pieces  together,  picking  and  choosing  to  pay 
attention and ignore” (Calás and Smircich, 1999). What is more problematic in research writing, 
according  to  these  authors,  is  unrecognised  partiality,  which  leads  them  to  advocate  “modest 
narratives” that make researchers’ partial choices clear: “Can we do our writing in a way that is 
‘self-conscious’ of our ‘choices’?” (Calás and Smircich, 1999) 
Collecting data to analyse the institutionalisation process in one firm 
Drawing  on  our  previous  research
3,  we  observed  a  shift  in  the  institutional  logic  driving  the 
pharmaceutical industry. Acknowledging this phenomenon was our primary motivation in writing 
                                                 
3 An analysis of the French pharmaceutical field is proposed in a case study hinging on semi-structured interviews 
conducted in eleven pharmaceutical companies, two leading providers of medical data worldwide and one pharmacy 
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this paper. Since the end of the 1990’s, more and more laboratories have imported control practices 
from the consumer goods industry. To understand how this changing logic in the pharmaceutical 
field  becomes  institutionalised  within  management  control  systems,  data  from  one  specific 
pharmaceutical laboratory has been collected.  
Antalgyx
4 is one of the leading pharmaceutical laboratories in the world. The laboratory posted a 
turnover of several billion dollars in 2003. To scrutinise the process of institutionalisation of new 
management control systems, we selected Antalgyx France because of its relevance to this issue
5 
and because of the opportunities of investigation through interviews that it offered. 
Thirteen semi-structured interviews constitute the core data of our analysis of Antalgyx (Table 2)
6. 
We interviewed all six management controllers at the headquarters of Antalgyx’s French subsidiary. 
We also interviewed seven people from the sales branch: a sales director, one zone manager, one 
regional manager, two drug representatives, a sales administrator and a sales efficiency supervisor.  
<<Insert Table 2 about here>> 
Analysing the data from an interpretative viewpoint 
As stated before, we consider management control systems as both a medium for and a target of the 
institutionalisation process. Management control systems are transformed by institutionalisation and 
at the same time they are the vectors through which the institutionalisation process can occur and 
can be observed. 
Responding to a call for a more comprehensive study of MCS (Otley, 1980; Chenhall, 2003), we 
use a broad definition of MCS in this research. We argue that MCS is “a combination of control 
mechanisms  designed  and  implemented  by  management  to  increase  the  probability  that 
organisational  actors  will  behave  in  ways  consistent  with  the  objectives  of  the  dominant 
organisational coalition” (Abernethy and Chua, 1996), and investigate a combination of controls 
including cultural, behavioural and output controls (Merchant, 1982; Merchant and Van der Stede, 
2003). Based on the recommendations of Otley (1980) and Abernethy and Chua (1996), we observe 
the control mix of Antalgyx. Leading on from Abernethy and Chua (1996), three elements of the 
control mix are more specifically analysed: the management culture, the division of powers amongst 
the departments, and the principles of accountability. The management culture of an organisation 
encourages the alignment of the values in the organisation (Merchant and Van der Stede, 2003). In 
our study, we consider management culture as the way the organisation sees its environment. The 
division of power refers to the dominant coalition in an organisation (i.e. the most influential group 
or department in decision-making). This is a fundamental element of the control mix since previous 
studies  show  that  different  professions  control  labour  differently  (Armstrong,  1985;  Carter  and 
Crowther, 2000). Accountability principles refer to the way individuals are made responsible and 
accountable in the organisation (Roberts, 1991). Accountability is at the heart of management by 
                                                                                                                                                                 
control  mix  of  this  industry  is  presented  in  a  case  study  based  on  interviews  in  four  leading  consumer  goods 
multinationals (Lambert, 2005). 
4 Antalgyx is a pseudonym in accordance with the wishes of the organisation concerned. We argue, as do Carter & 
Crowther (2000), that far from compromising the richness of the data collected, this actually serves to enhance the 
depth and scope of access since the organisation is assured of confidentiality. 
5 In previous research mentioned above (Dambrin, 2005), Antalgyx was one of the eleven pharmaceutical laboratories 
under  study.  In  our  view,  interviews  with  management  controllers  and  salespeople  from  Antalgyx  hinted  at  the 
importation of fundamentals from the consumer goods industry. 
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objectives (Munro and Haterly, 1993), one of the functions of MCS. These three elements of the 
control mix structure our reading grid for analysing the MCS of Antalgyx.  
After  having  clarified  what  we  want  to  observe,  we  shed  light  on  how  we  processed  the  data 
collected from the interviews. Recordings of interviews were transcribed and coded for NUDIST 
NVIVO, a qualitative data analysis programme. This programme allows interview material to be 
coded line-by-line under the categories determined by the researchers. Codes can be drawn up from 
three  obvious  sources:  existing  research  questions,  theory,  and  empirical  data;  and  more 
importantly, the interaction of these three elements during the conducting of research (Anderson-
Gough et al., 2005). We built a framework of nine codes inspired by our theoretical framework (the 
institutionalisation process according to NIS) and by the three elements of control mix we have 
chosen to observe. The coding framework has been elaborated by going back and forth from our 
theoretical  framework  to  our  analysis  of  the  empirical  data.  Therefore,  to  analyse  the 
institutionalisation process of the consumer goods industry logic at work in the management control 
system of Antalgyx, we read our interviews according to the coding framework presented in Table 
3. 
<<Insert Table 3 about here>> 
Ideals and discourses are mainly differentiated according to the data source involved and the level 
of analysis. Ideals are developed in journal articles, professional reviews, and annual reports. They 
deal  with  the  organisational  field.  Discourses  emerge  from  quotations  by  the  individuals  at 
Antalgyx.  Techniques  are  described  using  documents  provided  by  individuals  (reportings, 
performance measurement grids, etc.) and the comments individuals make on these documents. 
This  data  gathering  on  techniques  is  completed  by  the  discourses  of  service  providers  in  the 
pharmaceutical industry. We should also point out that, in our grid, techniques are not necessarily 
developed by the departments relating to them. For instance, recruitment strategies concerning the 
drug representatives may be directly decided by the sales department rather than by the human 
resources department. 
Giving voice to people to enrich theory 
Our coding framework not only simplifies the complexity and richness of ‘real’ speech collected 
during the case study but also account for partial choices. With this case study, we are not looking 
for an exhaustive representation of reality but rather for “the proxy to speak” in place of those who 
cannot tell the full story (such as interviewees) (Quattrone, 2006). This case study aims to give 
voice  to  people.  How  do  they  express  their  feelings  about  the  evolution  of  their  role  in  the 
organisation? How do they understand their organisation’s fundamentals? Do they find their place 
in light of these fundamentals? Do they appropriate change for themselves? And, more importantly, 
do they have a possible influence on this change of fundamentals? Indeed, with this case study, we 
intend to go beyond one of the major criticisms that can be levelled at neo-institutional sociological 
research: a disembodied programme, where the institutionalisation process is linear and precedes 
individuals, and where individuals, if present, are only there through a role. This intention falls 
within the scope of researchers’ calls for narratives which focus on human beings not with a view to 
normalising  them  but  to  highlighting  their  diversity  (Quattrone,  2006).  Giving  voice  to  people 
certainly implies the risk of data not fitting perfectly into the theoretical reading grid that has been 
solicited,  but  we  are  convinced  that  theory  development  will  result  from  these  gaps  between 
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case study aims to enrich the comprehension of the institutionalisation process by accounting for 
people’s behaviours and beliefs throughout this process. 
4. Case Study Background 
In  the  French  pharmaceutical  industry
7,  three  market  segments  may  be  identified:  “Ethical 
pharmacy” (grouping together products obtained with a medical prescription); Over-The-Counter 
(OTC) drugs (meaning products that can be provided without a medical prescription); and Generics 
(meaning drugs that have fallen into the public domain). Until now, ethical pharmacy has been 
highly constrained by its technically and institutionally specific environment in France.  
First of all, the pharmaceutical industry is a highly regulated industry because it deals with the 
healthcare of the patient, but also because numerous interested parties are trying to reduce the cost 
of drug expenditure (Moss and Schuiling, 2003). In France, drugs are subject to administrative 
authorisation before being marketed. The notice of compliance granted on the basis of results from 
clinical trials has existed since 1972. It is regulated by the Agence Française du Médicament (the 
French Drug Agency). Drug prices are negotiated with the public authorities
8 (Pignarre, 2003). 
Contrary to other countries, direct-to-consumer advertising (such as commercials) for prescribed 
drugs is totally forbidden
9.  
Secondly, the lifetime of products in the pharmaceutical industry is limited (patent expiry). A new 
drug is patented as soon as it is developed and the patent lasts, in general, for up to ten years before 
the notice of compliance is issued. After authorisation to market, the drug is protected for another 
ten years before falling into the public domain (legislation passed in 1968 and slightly modified in 
1978) (Chauveau, 1999).  
Finally, within the organisational field of ethical pharmacy, doctors and pharmacists represent an 
additional  layer  between  the  patient  (end  consumer)  and  the  drug  manufacturer  (Moss  and 
Schuiling, 2003). They are the prescribers, the purchasing advisors, who play a key role in the sales 
process. Nevertheless, the scope of the marketing techniques which can be used by pharmaceutical 
companies to persuade these prescribers is strictly limited by the law (Charrondière, 2003). 
The characteristics of the institutional environment explain the institutional logic of this sector: 
strong R&D, aggressive defence of patents, and a powerful sales force (Moss and Schuiling, 2003; 
Styhre and Sundgren, 2003). In the ethical pharmacy field, the resources allocated to R&D are 
considerable because identifying new drugs is seen as a key success factor ensuring high profit 
margins: “all activity focuses on inventing and legally protecting the inventions” (Pignarre, 2003).  
Thus, in the organisational field of ethical pharmacy, the main institutional logic is to promote 
medical innovation. R&D and the sales department are the key departments and the main client 
targeted  is  the  practitioner.  As  a  result,  the  management  controller’s  role  is  often  limited  to 
bookkeeping (Lambert, 2005) and the marketers are support staff at the service of the sales force 
(Dambrin, 2005) (see Figure 2).  
                                                 
7 France has 205,437 doctors, 22,000 pharmacies and 20,000 drug representatives (Sicart, 2003). 
8 Such is the case in other European countries, whereas in the USA, drug prices are negotiated with Health Maintenance 
Organisations and private medical insurers. 
9 Direct-to-consumer advertising for a drug is only authorised if this drug is not subject to prescription, if it is not 
covered by any mandatory healthcare insurance schemes, and if the notice of compliance or public registering does not 
include any restrictions with regard to direct-to-consumer advertising due to potential risks to public health (Article 
L5122-6 of the Public Health Code, legislation dating from 9








































0  11 
<<Insert Figure 2 about here>> 
Finding inspiration in the consumer goods industry’s experience appears to be increasingly critical 
in ethical pharmacy (Panigyrakis and Veloutsou, 1999; Moss and Schuiling, 2003). However, the 
technical and institutional environments of ethical pharmacy and the consumer goods industry are 
very  different  (Panigyrakis  and  Veloutsou,  1999;  Moss  and  Schuiling,  2003).  In  the  consumer 
goods industry, marketing and cost control are key factors of success. Products can exist forever if 
managed  well  (Moss  and  Schuiling,  2003).  Innovations  are  primarily  marketing  innovations 
(Robinson  and  Fornell,  1985;  Alessandri  and  Alessandri,  2004;  Dupre  and  Gruen,  2004).  As 
mentioned  on  Unilever’s  website,  for  instance,  “in  2004,  we  invested  over  a  billion  Euros  in 
research and development [compared to] €5.7 billion in advertising and promotions”.  
The  consumer  goods  industry  manages  its  brands  with  extreme  care  and  invests  most  of  its 
resources  in  developing  brands
10,  which  are  considered  major  competitive  tools  (Moss  and 
Schuiling, 2003). In this industry, management control is integrated into operational teams to ensure 
cost control at every step. Tandems or business teams, based on partnerships between controllers 
and brand managers, are set up and run like micro-enterprises (Lambert, 2005) (see Figure 3).  
<<Insert Figure 3 about here>> 
The logics of both sectors appear quite distinct. But professional publications (Panigyrakis and 
Veloutsou, 1999; Moss and Schuiling, 2003) and interviews in ethical pharmacy (Dambrin, 2005; 
Lambert, 2005) indicate that the principles of the consumer goods industry are disseminating in the 
basics  of  ethical  pharmacy,  accounting  for  a  change  in  institutional  logic.  Indeed,  since  1975, 
ethical pharmacy has increasingly faced a “pincer movement”: R&D costs are doubling every five 
years whilst discoveries of new drugs that will generate strong turnover are becoming more and 
more infrequent (Moss and Schuiling, 2003; Pignarre, 2003). What results from this is an erosion of 
earnings-per-share  for  the  twenty  leading  laboratories  worldwide
11.  In  France,  laboratories  are 
additionally subject to increasingly stringent regulatory constraints
12. Manufacturers’ margins for 
manoeuvre are being reduced and the traditional fundamentals of pharmaceutical marketing are 
undergoing an upheaval (Charrondière, 2003). Adopting the model of the consumer goods industry 
appears to be the remedy for this crisis. We may wonder as to the reasons that led ethical pharmacy 
in France to take this sector as a model. Two reasons may be put forward. Firstly, this sector already 
inspires  in  part  the  practices  of  the  other  market  segments  (OTC  and  Generics).  Secondly, 
subsidiaries in countries with more flexible regulation are emulating this model.  
Changes are presented as necessary for the efficiency of organisations in the ethical pharmacy 
sector. However, they also reflect the evolution of the cognitive institutional logic and the vision of 
what is a well-managed organisation in this field. The initial difference between the two models 
leads us to hypothesise that the shift from the pharmaceutical model to the consumer goods model 
implies a profound change in the institutional logic of the pharmaceutical sector. We may ask 
                                                 
10 The Economist, “The rise of the superbrands” (2/5/2005, p. 63-65) 
11 An earnings-per-share ratio of 28% for the shareholder from 1993 to 1998 compared to 4 to 5% since 1999. Source: 
The Pharma 2010 Study conducted by IBM Business Consulting Services (Lorelle, 2003) 
12 The sector’s environment has become considerably tougher over the last few months, notably due to State budget 
legislation in 2002 and 2003 regarding: the application of fixed-rate reimbursement for a certain number of generic 
groups;  the  strengthening  of  regulation  regarding  promotional  expenditure;  the  programmed  termination  of 
reimbursement for 650 products; cost-cutting measures announced for hospitals; and the rationalising of medication 
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ourselves how the changing institutional logic in the ethical industry develops inside firms within 
this organisational field. The next section presents the institutionalisation process of the new logic 
throughout the three elements of the control mix at Antalgyx: the management culture, the relative 
power of the different departments, and the accountability principles. 
5. An Untidy Process of Institutionalisation 
To observe the process of institutionalisation at Antalgyx, we have identified the ideals conveyed in 
the organisational field, but also how discourses and techniques develop within the organisation by 
looking at each aspect of the control mix. This leads us to take some distance from the linear nature 
of  the  institutionalisation  process.  Our  findings  also  call  into  question  the  systematic  and  the 
exhaustive nature of the process. As stated above, individuals must internalise the new logic by 
themselves for institutionalisation to be complete. In this respect, we show that, far from being 
adopted entirely, the new institutional logic is not fully deployed.  
5.1. Towards a different management culture: from innovation to replication? 
The new MCS at Antalgyx has first been analysed according to the management culture it conveys. 
Referring  to  data  from  the  Internet  sites  of  pharmaceutical  trade  associations  and  professional 
journals,  it  appears  that  the  mission  of  ethical  pharmacy  is  innovation.  This  ideal  is  highly 
ambiguous,  and  may  be  seen  as  serving  the  ‘market  rationale’  as  well  as  the  ‘public  health 
rationale’. At Antalgyx, while a new discourse on profitability is emerging, the primary concern—
developing innovative drugs—seems to remain unquestioned. However, marketing tools deriving 
from  the  consumer  goods  industry  and  dedicated  to  profit  measurement  and  development  are 
widespread and widely used.    
An ambiguous ideal: innovation… or replication? 
Traditionally, the sustainability of pharmaceutical laboratories depends on their capacity to innovate 
(Guannel  et  al.,  2003).  Innovation  is  deeply  integrated  in  the  management  culture  of  the 
pharmaceutical sector: it can be seen as an ideal in this organisational field. The Pharmaceutical 
Research and Manufacturers of America (PhRMA) and Les Entreprises du Médicament in France, 
share an almost identical mission statement: 
“PhRMA's mission is to conduct effective advocacy for public policies that encourage discovery 
of important new medicines for patients by pharmaceutical/biotechnology research companies” 
(http://www.phrma.org/) 
As  a  consequence,  the  goal  of  pharmaceutical  laboratories  is  to  develop  what  are  called 
“blockbusters”: particularly innovative drugs. Such an innovative drug must generate significant 
revenues (i.e. an annual turnover of 1 billion euros or more) to finance future research. 
Today, the pace of innovative drug rollouts is decreasing considerably and steadily, making the 
development of blockbusters an increasingly challenging issue (Moss and Schuiling, 2003). The 
average number of drugs marketed by each big group has shifted from 12.3 over the period of 1991-
1995 to 7.2 over the period of 1996-2000
13. As a result, the genuine differences in competing 
products’ clinical data are getting smaller (Moss and Schuiling, 2003) and laboratories are looking 
to create blockbusters from non-innovative products. A blockbuster—even a non-innovative one—
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is legitimised by its contribution to financing research. The blockbuster is becoming a fundamental 
element in laboratories’ institutional communication policy.  
With the decrease in innovation, success no longer tends to result in the capacity to innovate but in 
the  capacity  to  convince  stakeholders  that  the  firm  has  innovated.  Communication  policies  are 
spreading  throughout  the  research  process.  Laboratories  depend  on  shareholders  to  finance 
increasingly costly R&D and on the State to obtain notices of compliance for their innovations. 
They must therefore persuade stakeholders of their potential to innovate by communicating on the 
number of drugs under development. Indeed, financial analysts pay almost exclusive attention to a 
laboratory’s pipeline before making buy/sell recommendations for the company’s shares (Pignarre, 
2003). Laboratories must also persuade the State of the innovative character of the drugs they seek 
to market. With this in mind, they are multiplying the number of clinical trials on these drugs 
because a clinical trial allows them to prove that the drug being tested is superior to any previous 
drug
14.  Drews  correlates  the  lack  of  ‘real’  innovation  of  pharmaceutical  laboratories  to  their 
growing  concern  about  commercial  and  financial  issues  (Drews,  1998).  Finally,  it  seems  that 
communication on innovation is supplanting innovation itself. 
The ideal of the management culture remains innovation. Yet the nature of innovation seems to be 
changing. We observe a slow shift from a logic of medical innovations to a logic of marketing 
innovations. The primary goal of pharmaceutical laboratories—innovation—appears to be evolving 
towards  a  desire  to  communicate  on  innovation.  Research  is  thus  placed  at  the  service  of  the 
marketing  process:  the  essential  challenge  is  no  longer  to  innovate  radically  but  to  make  the 
innovation appear to be radical
15. This leads to a logic of replication and adaptation of existing 
products, similar to the consumer goods industry.  
The slow emergence of profitability in the discourse 
The ambiguity of the ideal of the sector is translated in the discourse within Antalgyx. 
Developing a discourse on profitability is particularly judicious since it is compatible with both 
innovation  and  replication  ideals.  Depending  on  its  audience,  Antalgyx  communicates  on 
profitability either as a means to enable innovation or as an end in itself, justifying a replication 
logic. 
On  the  one  hand,  Antalgyx’s  institutional  communication  portrays  research  in  the  lead  role. 
Antalgyx’s Internet site presents the laboratory’s mission as being “focused on turning good ideas 
into innovative, effective medicines that make a real difference in important areas of healthcare” 
and not as the sale of drugs. This mission statement not only constitutes an element of external 
communication  but  is  also  present  in  the  representations  that  employees  have  of  the  strategic 
positioning of the group:  
We are in the ethical business. We focus on high added values, we are not going into generics, and we 
                                                 
14 The pharmaceutical industry was initially reluctant to accept the obligation of clinical trials. It turned the situation to 
its favour by specialising in this type of study. Initially designed as a means for the State to control the pharmaceutical 
industry, clinical trials have been integrated by the pharmaceutical industry into the core of its business. The system of 
clinical trials is a brake on innovation and “is (slowly) killing the goose that lays the golden eggs”, because “clinical 
trials put a premium on inventing successors at the expense of radical novelties” (Pignarre, 2003). 
15 For instance, the Fournier laboratories did not hesitate to bring out a new version of their 160mg Lipanthyl product as 
soon as the 67mg and 200mg packs fell into the public domain. Astra Zeneca slightly changed the formula of its fetish 
anti-ulcer drug, Mopral, which, with Inexium, is the best selling drug in France. Even though any improvement in 
medical treatment provided by this new drug was deemed “minor” by authorities, the modified drug will no doubt 
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are not going into OTCs. [...] We have embarked on a strategy of discovering new drugs [...] it is not 
the same strategy as for generics where we wait for the drug’s patent to expire in order to take the 
drug and copy it. (Alain, Management Controller, Subsidiary, Antalgyx) 
The ethical market appears through these remarks as the most noble of the sector’s three strategic 
business  segments.  The  label  “ethical”,  referring  to  products  provided  uniquely  on  medical 
prescription, helps to foster an ideal of a corporate citizen committed to improving public health. 
Moreover, some interviewees mentioned that talking about money was considered, to a certain 
extent, “dirty”. If we add to this the imperative to innovate that is characteristic of the ethical 
market, we understand why controlling costs, one of the key factors of success in the consumer 
goods industry, may be presented as a minor concern.  
Personally, I think that there is still so much money in the pharmaceutical industry that we can afford 
to lose some. (Matthieu, Management Controller, Business Unit, Antalgyx) 
On  the  other  hand,  there  are  signs  of  an  emerging  issue  of  profitability  in  our  interviewees’ 
discourse. Some, like Cyril, legitimise this evolution through a temporal dynamic: 
Today, problems in [the market of] ethical drugs have changed. The mindset is more rational and 
leans towards profitability. (Cyril, Management Controller, Business Unit, Antalgyx) 
Others  suggest  a  reading  in  terms  of  coercive  isomorphism.  Shareholders  set  the  norms  of 
profitability for organisations.  
There is one very classical external phenomenon, which is the logic of shareholders and governance 
partners. For shareholders, until very recently, we were raking in such a margin that they were happy 
with what they got. Now, they are starting to ask questions. And the market is also shrinking and 
everything is tightening up. The big groups, even if they are very profitable, are going to be compared 
to each other, so of course, it will be the most profitable that wins. [...] Everything is moving towards 
a  consumer  goods  logic  because  it’s  what  the  market  wants.  We  are  going  to  have  policies  for 
communicating with our shareholders that will tend towards logics of the consumer goods industry, so 
we will have reactions of this type. (Matthieu, Management Controller, Business Unit, Antalgyx) 
Discourse  that  can  be  related  to  the  management  culture  of  the  organisation  thus  remains 
ambiguous.  One  the  one  hand,  it  appears  that  the  ethical  aspect  of  the  business  remains 
unquestioned, and unquestionable, but on the other hand, some actors also underline a growing and 
unavoidable emerging question of profitability. 
Therefore,  Antalgyx  is  very  careful  when d eveloping  a  discourse  on  profitability  because  of 
conflicting interests between stakeholders (the State vs shareholders). When addressing patients or 
governmental organisations, Antalgyx claims that identifying innovative molecules is its priority. It 
does not emphasize the commercial success that these innovations will obviously bring, since it 
would conflict with these stakeholders’ interests. At the same time, shareholders only want to hear 
about profitability.  
Shareholders  are  those  who  limit  long-term  investments.  They  are  so  focused  on  immediate 
profitability… A good study on heavy pathologies costs several million euros in investment, generating 
results in 5 years. It’s difficult with the shareholders… However, only big companies like us have the 
funding to conduct intensive research. We are innovative only because shareholders provide us with 
funding. But we are also fragile, because if we do not put profitable drugs on the market regularly  
enough, the house of cards will fall down. (Julien, Regional Manager, Antalgyx) 
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Marketing techniques imported from the consumer goods industry  
The  marketing  techniques  used  reflect  a  new  representation  of  business  fundamentals.  By 
employing these marketing techniques, Antalgyx is sliding from a logic of innovation towards a 
logic  of  replication.  Even  though  research  into  new  innovative  drugs  remains  of  paramount 
importance, the regular and minimal earnings demanded by shareholders are ensured with the help 
of techniques for optimally exploiting the portfolio of existing products.  
Amongst  these  techniques,  several  consist  in  slightly  altering  the  existing  product  (a  different 
dosage or formula): 
We have a product that is about to fall into the public domain. So we are launching Criter, which is a 
product that is very similar, and hope that it will help to check this shift into the public domain. (Cyril, 
Management Controller, Business Unit, Antalgyx) 
The objective here is clearly not linked to an ideal of innovation but rather to an ideal of replication. 
Antalgyx is willing to reduce its losses linked to the shift into the public domain by launching a 
product very similar to the old one. In order to obtain the authorization to market, Antalgyx must 
persuade the State of the innovative character of this so-called “new” drug they seek to market. 
Here, rather than making investments in the uncertain development of new molecules, Antalgyx 
spends its money on clinical trials to prove that the drug being tested is superior to any previous 
drug.    
Other  techniques  stem  from  marketing:  the  product  portfolio  is  changed,  without  altering  the 
products, by purchasing, selling or sharing drug formulas.  
Personally, I’ve worked on proposals for co-branding, with another laboratory. It’s the same drug 
and the same product. One of the laboratories owns it and we are actually going to market it under 
two different names. The advantage of doing co-branding is that we have greater market share. This is 
because laboratories, in general, have expertise in certain treatments–cardio, cancer, etc. [...]. It’s 
like  Renault  and  Peugeot.  It  might  be  attractive  to  capitalise  on  the  clientele  pool  of  another 
laboratory to enter a market. (Alain, Management Controller, Subsidiary, Antalgyx) 
Techniques are also developed in order to measure the profitability of new marketing strategies and, 
more generally, promotional operations. Here again, resources are spent on techniques linked to the 
replication ideal rather than to the innovation ideal. These techniques, based on the panel principle, 
first emerged in the consumer goods industry
16. For instance, IMS Strategy Evaluator is a recent 
tool that illustrates this desire to measure the efficiency of promotional operations:  
Today, we are capable of measuring the performance of doctors who are dispersed geographically but 
share the common feature, for example, of having been targeted by a public relations initiative, of 
having taken part in a phase IV study or in a conference at the same time. We dispose of cumulated 
data on doctors who share this common trait. For the first time, the pharmaceutical industry has a 
real measurement tool at its disposal for measuring the efficiency of promotional operations. And 
today, this is the major issue facing all industry leaders. (Gontran, Managing Director, IMS Health)  
Finally, laboratories are increasingly investing in “communication on products” for a wider public. 
The  patient  now  represents  an  unavoidable  target.  This  is  illustrated  by  the  use  of  new 
communication tools with the development of toll-free telephone numbers and theme-based Internet 
                                                 
16  Icomed  is  a  tool  for  analysing  medical  prescriptions;  the  CAM  measures  the  return  on  investment  for  specific 
operations. These two techniques are based on a survey of a panel of doctors. Xponent and Thales are databases that 
link the medical prescription to the geographical location of the prescriber. These two tools are updated using data 
regarding the prescriptions bought within a more or less broad sample of doctors (10,200 pharmacies for Xponent, 
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sites  and  the  development  of  general  public  communication  campaigns  enabling  Antalgyx  to 
reinforce institutional communication whilst directly targeting the general public. 
Marketing techniques are clearly linked to the emerging ideal of replication. In this element of the 
control mix, it thus appears that a new ideal is developed into techniques without being explicitly 
echoed  in  discourse.  As  we  have  seen,  Antalgyx  wishes  to  keep  an  ambiguous  discourse  on 
profitability  that  can  be  heard  by  all  audiences.  Therefore,  discourse  cannot  be  a  basis  for 
developing techniques in the case of management culture.  
Internalisation of the new management culture? 
The internalisation of the new management structure is called into question here with regard to two 
aspects: the change in the representation of the key success factors amongst individuals at Antalgyx, 
and the active use of tools linked to a consumer goods management culture. 
People at Antalgyx do not all fully adhere to the change in management culture. On the one hand, 
management controllers are actively diffusing the “credo” of profitability, especially for gaining 
power. 
With project supervisors, we played nimbly on the international context. […] We managed to pull the 
wool over their eyes by saying, “But you realise that we are moving towards the consumer goods 
industry, so the financial logic is more and more omnipresent”. What’s more, we were swimming in it 
everyday.  Everyday,  the  CEO  was  asking  for  more  and  more  figures  and  the  like.  (Matthieu, 
Management Controller, Business Unit, Antalgyx) 
Yet, on the other hand, it remains clear that, within the sales department, Antalgyx is not, or should 
not behave like, a consumer goods industry. 
Here,  we  invest  a  lot  of  money  in  R&D.  We  are  very  discrete  on  marketing,  at  least  as  far  as 
institutional communication is concerned. […] We don’t sell any consumer goods products; we are 
focused on products requiring a medical prescription. (Felix, Drug Representative, Antalgyx) 
Antalgyx is a marketing company. The problem here is that they give too much priority to marketing. 
(Julien, Regional Manager, Antalgyx) 
With regard to tools, it appears that the logic of return on marketing investment is just starting to 
emerge in the income statement:  
Previously, analysis that we conducted internally of the whole product range just looked at turnover. 
Now, we are going to do P&L, monitoring the return on investment on marketing expenditure, and so 
launch the logic of ROI in the company. For the time being, it is not at all structured, because, in fact, 
it is like facing a virgin forest in which you’d like to build a floral garden. (Matthieu, Management 
Controller, Business Unit, Antalgyx) 
And sometimes, ratios seem to be mimetically adopted without any adaptation. The ceremonial 
dimension of these tools appears clear: whereas institutional communication meets the expectations 
of shareholders, internal management may ignore these pressures. 
The ratio they use here, which is visibly their contribution rate (marketing costs divided by sales) is, 
for me, like dealing with apples and oranges. It doesn’t make sense [...]. Because there is no logic. 
(Alexandre, Management Controller, Business Unit, Antalgyx)  
 
In conclusion, two ideals coexist: one concerns innovation, the other replication. The discourse on 
profitability and profit smoothing is developing only tentatively. In contrast, marketing techniques 
inspired by the consumer goods industry are becoming widely used. Nevertheless, these techniques 
are  used  in  a  ceremonial  way  when  it  comes  to  “truly”  operational  levels  and  performance 
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goods industry. A loose coupling is thus observed and institutionalisation is far from completed. We 
also  observe  that  the  process  does  not  appear  linear,  in  a  top-down  movement  from  ideals  to 
discourses, but rather it acts in the organisation through techniques.  
5.2. Towards  a  reshuffling  of  the  trump  cards:  the  rise  in  power  of  the  marketing  and 
management control departments? 
After observing the management culture at Antalgyx, the change of MCS is analysed according to 
the division of powers amongst the departments, i.e. identifying the dominant coalition within the 
organisation. Due to legal and professional regulation, the institutional logic of ethical pharmacy 
tends to take for granted the mediated relationship with the end consumer, namely the patient, and 
the dominant position of the ‘visiteurs médicaux’ (drug representatives) within the organisation. In 
France,  drug  representatives  are  organised  into  a  profession
17.  But  a  new  ideal  seems  to  be 
emerging: the pharmaceutical sector seeks to get direct access to the patient and thus to bypass 
doctors  and  drug  reps.  This  leads  to  key  actors  having  a  representation  of  the  purchasing 
relationship that is very close to that of the fast moving consumer goods industry. Furthermore, 
when observing changes in recruitment initiatives targeting marketing profiles, it appears that, once 
again, the process of institutionalisation of the new logic is essentially led by techniques. Indeed, 
discourse  within  the  organisation  actually  shows  that  the  importance  of  the  sales  department 
remains unquestioned. Institutionalisation is not completed since the dominant sales department 
maintains its power in decision-making and manages to keep the management controllers at arm’s 
length.     
A new ideal: bypassing the doctor  
Compared to other countries, the marketing policies of pharmaceutical laboratories in France are 
subject to a particularly restrictive regulatory framework (Charrondière, 2003). The law constitutes 
a strong coercive force in this sector. In the ethical sector, the only prescriber is the doctor who 
alone can judge which drugs are most likely to meet the patient’s medical needs. Regulation puts a 
brake  on  laboratories’  marketing  expenditure  that  targets  patients  directly.  Due  to  this  tight 
regulation, the role of drug representatives is all the more crucial as they are the favoured channel of 
communication  and  promotion  at  the  laboratories’  disposal  to  make  their  products  known  and 
stimulate their sales
18. As a result, drug representative visits in France represent on average 70 % of 
a  laboratory’s  total  expenditure  on  promotion,  whereas  in  the  United  States,  distributing  free 
samples and ‘Direct To Consumer’ promotions alone have captured almost 70 % of promotional 
investment (Charrondière, 2003). 
                                                 
17 There is an indispensable know-how to doing the job as public health legislation stipulates. Drug reps are, “persons 
who  provide  information  or  conduct  prospecting  for  medical  treatment  [and]  must  possess  sufficient  scientific 
knowledge certified by a diploma, title or certificate that is included in a list drawn up by the administrative authority”, 
article L5122-11 of the French public health code. The Public Health Law of 18
th January 1994 specifies that the drug 
representative must possess a national diploma for drug representation, a university degree or a medical degree provided 
by certain faculties of medicine, pharmacy or science. 
18 Amongst the means used to inform the prescriber, Pignarre quotes presentations given by drugs representatives 
(whose network is strengthened by calling on external service providers, notably to improve the implantation of new 
drugs), invitations for prescribers to information meetings, proposals by drug reps to the doctors to conduct remunerated 
studies, offers to participate in phase 4 clinical trials, and invitations to conferences, dinners, etc. All of these means 
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Anticipating a market and legal shift towards an institutional environment similar to that in the 
United States, pharmaceutical firms believe that this sector will progressively become closer to the 
consumer  goods  industry.  New  forms  of  promotion  are  emerging  or  being  strengthened 
(Charrondière, 2003). Huge investments are being made in direct communication with the general 
public. In its annual reports, Antalgyx increasingly emphasizes the key role of marketing. The space 
dedicated to marketing policy expanded from one paragraph in 2000 (about 208 words) to one page 
in 2004 (more than 900 words) while the space dedicated to R&D remained the same. The annual 
report also underlines that Antalgyx invests a significant amount of money in direct-to-consumer 
advertising whenever it is possible. This increased focus on marketing and promotional issues is 
associated with a greater emphasis on performance and effectiveness in Antalgyx’s annual reports 
(for instance, the word “performance” appears 112 times in 2000 compared to 220 times in 2004). 
Traditionally,  the  development  of  cost-effective  marketing  policies  is  supported  by  “business 
teams” based on partnerships between controllers and brand managers. These tandems become key 
decision-makers, as is the case in the consumer goods industry.  
The rise in power of the marketing department is totally dependent on the ability of the industry to 
neutralise the power of the doctor and directly target the end customer, the patient. This increase in 
power is not an ideal per se, but it may be a sign of the decline in the power of the sales force, 
which is seen as both very costly and much more difficult to evaluate and control than marketing 
tools are. 
The sales department remaining the key department: discourse and taboo 
In the discourse, the dominant department clearly remains the sales department. The new ideal of 
bypassing the doctor imitates the style of organisation that can be found in the consumer goods 
industry, where controllers and brand managers constitute the key teams in the organisation. This 
new ideal is absolutely not developed in the discourse: such a reshuffling of the trump cards is a 
highly taboo subject as any change in the power relationships would be. 
 The emergence of the consumer goods industry logic finds expression in the willingness to set up a 
partnership  between  marketing  and  management  control,  a  key  success  factor  in  the  consumer 
goods  industry.  Yet,  within  pharmaceutical  laboratories,  scientific  knowledge  held  by  the 
commercial  departments  in  the  broadest  sense  of  the  term  (marketing  and  sales)  creates  an 
asymmetry of power in relation to the support departments. The latter are considered illegitimate to 
intervene in the backyard of the “scholarly” departments.  
I don’t see how we could entrust things as controversial as drugs to people other than doctors or 
pharmacists  or  chemists.  I  think  that  we  should  remain  humble  in  our  relations  with  operational 
managers because the expertise is more on their side. (Alain, Management Controller, Subsidiary, 
Antalgyx) 
Thus, the repositioning of management controllers as partners of marketing is rationalised using 
changes in the environment, whether real or alleged. The construction of the role of partner is based 
on  the  development  of  a  different  relational  network.  Management  controllers  aspire  to  have 
dialogue partners who are as good as those they may find in the consumer goods industry.  
We no longer communicate with the assistant. We now communicate with the product or product-line 
manager. Personally, I tend to want to communicate with the product-line manager alone, because, in 
a consumer goods logic, he is equal to the product manager. (Matthieu, Management Controller, 
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However, we should keep in mind that the repositioning of the marketing and control departments is 
a highly taboo subject. Indeed, if the top management were to develop discourse on this change, it 
would immediately face a drop in the motivation of the sales teams, which would interpret these 
changes as a loss of their power, influence and recognition within the firm. For this reason, the ideal 
of partnership between management control and marketing, likely to make the predominant position 
of the sales department more vulnerable, is rather sustained by techniques relating to the interaction 
between the departments: recruitment, participation in meetings, and spatial location.  
Using HRM techniques to support the institutional logic of the consumer goods industry  
The diffusion of the consumer goods industry logic entails modifying recruitment and promotion 
strategies. The first change in terms of recruitment deals with the scientific profile, which becomes 
secondary  for  both  drug  rep  and  marketing  recruitment.  In  the  marketing  department,  recruits 
formerly trained in pharmacy and medicine are today being replaced by young business school 
graduates with additional training in the form of a master’s degree in managing pharmaceutical 
companies. 
There are people freshly recruited in marketing who want to bring about innovation and others in 
management  control  with  new  logics  and  who  may  come  from  consumer  goods  or  elsewhere.  So 
management control is playing a role in the teams. (Matthieu, Management Controller, Business Unit, 
Antalgyx) 
This type of recruitment helps to create a partnership between marketing and management control. 
But these changes in recruitment echo promotion strategies in the sales department. Sales managers 
are increasingly recruited from the marketing department.  
For instance, our hospital manager comes from marketing after three months in sales and he thinks he 
knows  it  all.  He  reorganised  us  into  three  Business  Units.  The  three  managers  all  come  from 
marketing.  In  each  BU,  only  one  sales  manager  comes  from  sales.  Here,  our  head  is  neither  a 
salesman nor a communicator but a conceptual marketing man. They co-opt each other because they 
understand one another. (Julien, Regional Manager, Antalgyx) 
In addition, management controllers at Antalgyx are overwhelmingly hired from leading companies 
in the consumer goods industry. Once again, “creating a common language”, i.e. the language of 
profitability as opposed to the language of science, is the main objective. 
The  idea  was  to  change  the  way  others  think  by  bringing  in  people  from  outside.  Nathalie 
[management control director] sought to rebuild her team with this logic in mind because that is what 
she was asked to do. She went and hired Matthieu. They both came from Unilever; both were in 
detergents... I came from Henkel. We speak the same language. We are from the same school. We have 
the same ways of doing things. The idea is to have people from outside pharmacy who are not in the 
habit of saying: “We’ve got loads of money.” (Alexandre, Management Controller, Business Unit, 
Antalgyx) 
Recruiting candidates from the consumer goods industry transforms management controllers into 
vectors  for  introducing  and  disseminating  a  new  logic.  They  are  settling  in  operational  units 
whereas, traditionally, support functions were separated from commercial functions at the Antalgyx 
head office. Thus, management controllers are attempting to increase their proximity to operational 
managers  in  order  to  foster  partnership  between  the  management  control  and  marketing 
departments.  
When we have a position as “operational management controller” like Cyril or Matthieu, we spend 
40% of our time in information meetings, for our own benefit, but also to increase our power in terms 
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Until  today,  management  controllers  were  not  invited  to  these  meetings,  but  by  asserting 
themselves, they are now developing a social system of nodes within operational teams.  
Although the sales department remains influential, signs of a reshuffling of the trump cards are 
appearing through the emergence of a partnership between the management control and marketing 
departments and the recruitment of “less scientific profiles” in the sales and marketing departments. 
Behind this partnership looms the rising power of a new conception of accountability.  
An observed decoupling: the management controllers held at arm's length 
The partnership between marketing and management control that purports the ideal of a direct 
access to the patient should represent a threat for the traditional supremacy of the sales department: 
by  recruiting  management  controllers  with  consumer  goods  industry  experience,  Antalgyx  has 
developed and promoted a new function inside the organization that might  dethrone the sales 
department: the new coalition is considered as the vector for change (and not the salespeople) and in 
order to implement that change, more pressure is expected on salespeople activity as we will see in 
section 5.3. 
As  a  result,  according  to  management  controllers,  candidates  for  power  themselves,  the  sales 
department’s supremacy is not questioned at all.  
I tend to say that the management of sales is an entity in its own right, a State within a State. You 
realise that there are games being played between head office and the sales department, through perks 
and windfall bonuses tied to sales. But this over-performance is perhaps also tied to the work of the 
marketing department that won’t receive any one-off perks. The sales department has a lot of power. 
And that is very interesting from a behavioural point of view. The drug representative finds himself in 
already  conquered  territory  more  than  any  other  sales  representative.  (Matthieu,  Management 
Controller, Business Unit, Antalgyx) 
The drug reps’ favoured relationship with the prescribing doctor in conjunction with the difficulty 
in assessing end-consumer purchases conspire to make the sales department supreme within the 
organisation and puts into perspective the contribution of the marketing department.  
Two  elements  determine  the  singularity  of  the  drug  representative’s  visit  compared  to  sales 
departments in other sectors: the complex nature of the product, and the key position of the drug 
representative in the sales circuit.  
The drug representative can link his work to the products that are launched. If he doesn’t make a visit, 
no products are sold. In a hypermarket, if the sales rep doesn’t visit, products are still sold because 
everything has been negotiated at a national level and there will be sanctions if it isn’t the case. […] 
Furthermore, he doesn’t really have any knowledge of the product. To sell a washing powder, you 
don’t need to know how the product is chemically made […]. The drug rep, on the other hand, has to 
know a minimum about the drug so that there are enhanced relations with the doctor. Drug reps are 
also  obliged  to  follow  training  programmes  that  lead  to  a  diploma,  which  gives  them  a  certain 
legitimacy. (Matthieu, Management Controller, Business Unit, Antalgyx) 
 
Other signs of decoupling appear quite clearly, since those who have been designated vectors for 
change (i.e. management controllers) seem to be held at arm’s length from the information required 
for decision-making relating to the new institutional logic. Management controllers, who bring with 
them the problematic of profitability, are one of the levers of change in institutional logic. The 
interactions that they succeed in establishing with operational managers are a key instrument in 
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levels of the hierarchy. With regard to the sales force, the quotations below show that operational 
managers in the field are not part of a dialogue with management controllers
19: 
Relationships with management control are only at the level of sales directors, not below. We don’t 
have any vision of this. (Julien, Regional Manager, Antalgyx) 
My  favoured  interlocutors  in  the  sales  department  remain  the  senior  managers  of  drug 
representations.  I  am  supposed  to  go  as  far  as  zone  managers,  but  to  get  to  this  level,  I  will 
communicate with the senior managers at the drug representation level because they see each other 
regularly. In the future, we will seek to get to the level of regional directors, in meetings, by giving 
them the overarching principles. (Matthieu, Management Controller, Business Unit, Antalgyx) 
In the latter verbatim, the management controller’s desire to interact with the sales force in the field 
is manifest. However, this desire is contrary, so it seems, to the organisational choices that translate 
into keeping management controllers at arm’s length. For instance, management controllers are 
surprised not to have at their disposal the totality of data that would enable them to bring added 
value to the operational level.  
What people here call P&L is not quite that for me. I simply see sales and marketing costs […] In fact, 
I think we are in a fairly political milieu. Off the cuff, I find it hard to imagine that controllers who are 
working in a business sector do not know the margins that enable them to have discussions with 
operational managers. (Alexandre, Management Controller, Business Unit, Antalgyx) 
This desire to keep the management control department in the role of a staff function also translates 
into  terminating  management  controllers’  participation  in  reviewing  budgets.  In  light  of  this 
decision, the message conveyed to operational managers is therefore that management control is not 
to intervene in their core activities. 
 
To conclude, there is a desire to shift the ideal towards a direct relationship with the patient and the 
bypassing of both the doctor and the drug rep. Yet, the discourse on a reshuffling of the trump cards 
within  the  organisation  remains  totally  taboo.  In  order  to  promote  this  shift,  new  recruitment 
policies are developed. Once again, the process does not appear linear, in a top-down movement, 
but rather works in the organisation through techniques. However, when it comes to day-to-day 
activity, it seems that the sales department retains the right to have the final say in the decision-
making process. In this part of the control mix, a decoupling is also observed and institutionalisation 
is not completed.  
5.3. Towards new roles of accounting: a shift in accountability principles? 
Accountability principles, being the last element of MCS we scrutinised, are equally evolving when 
confronted with the logic of the consumer goods industry. The first shift in accountability principle 
ideals relates to the decreasing importance of the drug representative’s scientific skills. The drug 
representative  was  until  recently  the  key  actor  in  the  relationship  with  the  doctor.  In  this 
configuration,  the  drug  representative  was  held  responsible  for  the  accuracy  of  the  scientific 
message  conveyed  and  the  volume  of  sales.  The  new  ideal  is  to  promote  a  more  managerial 
conception of accountability, focusing on efficiency measurements, and drastically reducing drug 
reps’ autonomy. Result-based control, the mainstay of sales representatives in the pharmaceutical 
industry, is gradually being complemented by a behaviour-based control. The second shift in the 
                                                 
19 The structure of a sales force includes a marketing and sales director who supervises three sales directors, each having 
zone  managers  under  his  or  her  responsibility.  Only  at  this  level  do  operational  managers  then  appear:  regional 
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accountability principles ideal relates to a change in the targeted consumer: the drug representative 
is  held  decreasingly  accountable  for  persuading  the  doctor  to  prescribe,  but  increasingly 
accountable  for  the  purchasing  behaviour  of  the  patient.  These  new  ideals  are  supported  by  a 
discourse requiring a greater level of efficiency and transparency from drug representatives. The 
new ideal of assessment is partly deployed by means of an ambivalent use of activity reporting, and 
the  fine-tuning  of  assessment  and  performance  remuneration  techniques.  However,  the 
internalisation of the new norms is not complete, due to legal constraints regulating the profession 
as well as reluctance from the drug representatives themselves, supported by their hierarchy that is 
still powerful enough to resist the shift.  
A new ideal: from a professional vision to a managerial conception of accountability 
The assessment logic in the pharmaceutical industry is witnessing a growing interest in managerial 
ideals to frame behaviours in the sales force. The 2004 Antalgyx annual report states that “the 
company is committed to maintaining a dynamic performance culture in which every employee 
champions the growth of shareholder value […] In order to achieve this, remuneration policy and 
practice is designed: to closely align individual and team reward with business performance at each 
level; to encourage employees to perform to their fullest capacity, and; to align their interests with 
those of shareholders”. 
This leads to a clear shift in how the job of the drug rep is seen. While the business is increasingly 
perceived from a marketing mindset, the seller side of the drug rep’s job is emphasised to the 
detriment of its scientific side (Friedmann, 2005).  
In addition to this, the end consumer (i.e. the patient) is gradually being taken into account in 
performance  measurement  criteria.  As  is  the  case  in  the  consumer  goods  industry,  the  sales 
representative’s  performance  is  no  longer  assessed  based  solely  on  “sales  in”  (sales  to  the 
distributor, given by the GERS) but also on “sales out” (sales to the end consumer, calculated using 
new tools such as XPonent
20). The drug representative is also made increasingly accountable for the 
patient’s act of purchase as suggested by the CEO of one leading tool provider for measuring the 
pharmaceutical sales force performance. 
For the GERS, the representative’s performance is what pharmacists order. We say that that is not the 
most  accurate  way  of  assessing  a  representative’s  performance.  So  we  have  chosen  a  different 
methodology that gathers information when patients exit the pharmacy, meaning the patient’s act of 
purchase.  For  the  first  time,  we  are  really  capable  of  saying:  “the  drug  representative’s  real 
performance consists of the products prescribed by doctors whom he has visited, but which were then 
also bought at the pharmacy”. (Gontran, Managing Director, IMS Health) 
Today, the drug reps’ activity (meaning the number of daily contacts, compliance with the target 
list, etc.) is increasingly part of bonus criteria in tools proposed by service providers. A shift can be 
identified in the message conveyed to the sales force regarding data gathering designed to fine-tune 
the vision of performance. Laboratories are acquiring these tools with, alongside other objectives, 
the aim to give impetus to change in the assessment culture. This desire to assess and identify the 
exact performance of the drug representative can equally be deployed in payroll systems. 
Laboratories are increasingly priming their sales forces to target doctors. The reps will therefore only 
have to go and visit doctors who head office decides must been seen if reps want to attain their 
bonuses. If the rep wants to continue seeing his good friends, he’ll do so. But if this good friend is not 
                                                 
20 XPonent is a tool created in 1999 by IMS, the leading provider of medical data worldwide. From a panel of 47% of 
all  French  pharmacies,  it  performs  an  extrapolation  in  order  to  provide  its  clients  with  a  detailed  account  of 
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on the list drawn up by the laboratory, he will be wasting his time because he won’t be assessed on 
this, even if his friend writes prescriptions. (Gontran, Managing Director, IMS Health)  
Thus,  the  logic  of  assessment  as  practised  in  the  pharmaceutical  industry  is  witnessing  the 
emergence of a growing interest in managerial ideals framing behaviours in the sales force, which 
are developed into specific discourses relating to the mission of regional managers and their drug 
representatives. 
Developing a discourse on sales and efficiency 
The  two  main  shifts  in  accountability  principle  ideals  are  echoed  in  the  discourses  within  the 
organisation.  First,  the  ideal  of  drug  representatives  being  more  salesmen  than  scientific 
professionals is translated in the messages about both recruitment profiles and the drug rep’s role. 
We  also  have  regional  directors  who  do  recruitment  and  who  always  send  us  borderline  cases, 
meaning people who do not have sufficient sales sense and are too scientific. We will say to them: 
“Listen, in future recruitment, can you recruit sales profiles for me? A scientific background is fine 
but not enough”. (Donald, Zone Manager, Antalgyx) 
The role of the drug representative is to inform as well as possible on his speciality so that the drug is 
prescribed. Each of our drug reps has a goal in terms of prescription volume. [...] It is the sales side. 
It’s a slightly taboo word in the pharmaceutical industry, but we should still use it. From the moment 
that the rep informs so that others prescribe his product, somehow he is selling. This is what makes 
our company run or not. (Pascal, Sales Director, Antalgyx) 
The second trend towards a more “patient-oriented” rather than the former “doctor-oriented” sales 
strategy is translated and reinterpreted in the sales force’s discourse. What is underlined here are the 
links between the changing relationship with the doctor, and both the emergence of a new sales 
force organisation (development of networks) and the constantly shrinking autonomy of drug reps. 
Networks  of  drug  reps  are  increasing,  supposedly  in  order  to  improve  commercial  efficiency 
through greater presence at the customers’ places. Doctors actually don’t have the same relationship 
with drug reps when they are visited by many reps promoting the same products in a month. This 
multiplication of drug reps on each network could also be considered as a strategy by the laboratory 
to  control  the  special  relationship  between  reps  and  their  customers  better.  For  drug  reps,  this 
marketing  pressure  leads  to  diminishing  responsibility  and  a  poorer  quality  visit.  On  both  the 
operational and managerial level, because of increasing concerns about profitability, sales forces 
feel that their autonomy is declining.  
Today, with the proliferation of networks, targeting and the fact that drug representation at a doctor’s 
surgery is more and more costly, the degree of autonomy granted to the drug representative is getting 
smaller and smaller. (Robert, Sales Administrator, Antalgyx) 
This  discourse  is  shared  by  the  whole  sales  force:  the  increasing  marketing  pressure  and  the 
growing concern for profitability have an impact on the regional manager’s job as well as the drug 
representative’s. All have the impression that they are increasingly controlled, on a new basis and 
with a new impact on their daily work. As far as the regional managers are concerned, their work 
becomes more complex and more controlling. Whenever the regional manager needs to find out 
whether the drug rep is “doing his visits well”, they have to be increasingly sure of a given visit’s 
return on investment: has the salesman been efficient?  
Now, the markets are shrinking and we are starting to pay more and more attention to this. So we 
have to take on notions of coaching. The manager must know how his drug reps are conducting their 
sales and also know what we are spending in relation to that. (Matthieu, Management Controller, 
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This  reduction  of  autonomy  appears  in  new  performance  measurement  and  remuneration 
techniques.  
Control techniques: redefining the individual performance of drug reps 
Two control techniques to govern drug reps’ autonomy, i.e. individual performance measurement 
and  remuneration  techniques
21,  are  increasingly  used  to  make  drugs  reps  comply  with  activity 
directives  inspired  from  the  consumer  goods  industry’s  conception  of  accountability.  Firstly, 
detailed reports and data, which are usually gathered to identify potentially deviant behaviours, are 
used  to  assess  drug  reps’  individual  performances.  Secondly,  new  bonus  calculation  methods 
represent a growing desire to reduce the autonomy of drug reps.     
Sales force performances were traditionally measured with respect to either behaviour or outputs 
(Anderson and Oliver, 1987; Cravens et al., 1993; Oliver and Anderson, 1995), and control in the 
pharmaceutical  industry  seeks,  first  and  foremost,  to  know  the  output  of  reps  (measured  in 
turnover).  Laboratories  rely  on  powerful  tools  to  measure  turnover  on  the  basis  of  very  fine 
geographical units. These tools enable laboratories to measure the individual performances of the 
drug representatives
22.  
I have already had discussions with people working in the agribusiness who are surprised at all the 
tools that we have at our disposal. It’s like the science police and the local police, if you will: they’re 
from different worlds. (Pascal, Sales Director, Antalgyx) 
To  conduct  the  meticulous  follow-up,  Antalgyx,  like  most  laboratories,  relies  on  triangulating 
information  sources,  external  as  well  as  internal.  External  inquiries  are  conducted,  particularly 
involving doctors, to validate declarations made by drug representatives. Not only do laboratories 
check the accuracy of the marketing message that was delivered but also the reality of the visit. In 
addition to these inquiries, drug representatives must provide their hierarchy with numerous reports 
(visit reports, inquiries conducted at doctors’ surgeries, visit reports in tandem with the regional 
manager, reports on public relations operations, etc.).  
All these inquiries and reportings of activity may be exploited in an ambivalent way. From the 
ethical pharmacy perspective, they serve as an ideal for a Science Police that helps to understand 
the business. Until now, this mass of data served solely to pinpoint potentially deviant behaviours in 
the sales force such as bogus visits or expense forms that are tampered with. However, in the logic 
of the consumer goods industry, they are used as an assessment tool of individual performance. It 
appears that this second logic is gradually developing as suggested in the two following extracts: 
[Drug representatives] make daily reports, noting down their activity. They are monitored particularly 
with regard to targeting, choice of clientele, choice of doctors, and the frequency of their visits. All 
this is centralised here and put at the disposal of the zone manager and can even be consulted directly 
                                                 
21 Regarding the measurement of the sales force performance, two departments control the activity of the drug reps at 
Antalgyx:  Sales  Administration  and  Sales  Efficiency.  Sales  efficiency  designs  the  ratios  used  to  measure  sales 
performance and analyses sales force output. Sales administration focuses on, amongst other things, monitoring the 
activity of drug representatives: controlling expense forms, reporting activity, calculating bonuses, etc. 
22 In principle, pharmaceutical laboratories do not have access to prescriptions. Sales statistics always deal with groups 
of  doctors,  and  statistical  data  providers  must  call  upon  trustworthy  third  parties  to  obtain  the  data  that  has  been 
consolidated and made anonymous beforehand. Therefore, the real relevance of these tools can be questioned: do sales 
of a given drug at a chemist’s really correspond to the performance of a drug rep who can only incite doctors in the 
local area to prescribe it? However, the relevance of the performance measure relates to another research question. For 
instance, in France, the Groupement pour l’Elaboration et la Réalisation de Statistiques (GERS) was created in 1974 by 
and for the pharmaceutical industry to publish sales statistics. The data are not gathered from panels, but are real figures 
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by the drug representatives. (Pascal, Sales Director, Antalgyx) 
We also have target constraints with respect to doctors to visit and the frequency of visits relating to 
their potential. All this restricts our freedom. Increasingly, laboratories are trying to play the game 
well. In this context, we are becoming more and more like pure salesmen. Our commercial side is 
emphasised  because  laboratories  are  looking  for  results.  We  are  moving  towards  a  mass-market 
industry.  Things  are  increasingly  quantified;  we  have  really  clear  objectives.  (Felix,  Drug 
Representative, Antalgyx) 
As mentioned previously, performance remuneration is another control technique that assists in 
governing  drug  representative  autonomy.  Goal-dependent  payroll  devices  make  the  drug  reps’ 
activity transparent and dictate their behaviours. Previously, only results were taken into account in 
setting goals for drug representatives; today, goals also include the manner in which they conduct 
their business (number of contacts with doctors, number of professional relationships, etc.). Activity 
data are not only gathered to justify a potential ex-post sanction for a drug rep; they are also taken 
into account for annual pay rises. 
The obligation to behave according to predefined guidelines is illustrated by the fine-tuning of how 
the drug representative’s commission is now computed.  
Before, if the drug representative just reached his goal, he received a bonus. There was not really any 
crescendo as you may see elsewhere. Now, we are asking him to promote three products in a certain 
order during the visit. His commissions depend on his performances in each of these three products. 
(Matthieu, Management Controller, Business Unit, Antalgyx) 
Concerning bonuses, importance used to be placed on implantation only. Today, a lot of importance is 
also placed on developing market share. (Felix, Drug Representative, Antalgyx) 
When discussing with controllers, it seems only a matter of time before activity data are taken into 
account in the calculation of quarterly bonuses, and before the end consumer is fully integrated in 
the assessment of the drug representative’s performance. 
Observing the shifts in the ideals, discourses and techniques relating to accountability principles, it 
seems that this aspect of the control mix has already embraced the logic of the consumer goods 
industry. Nevertheless, clear signs of decoupling can be highlighted in the day-to-day practice.   
Internalisation or decoupling: a partly developed problematic of profitability 
The accountability principles relating to the logic of the consumer goods industry are witnessing a 
decoupling  phenomenon.  It  seems  that  assessment  techniques  are  not  used  to  measure  profit 
creation at an individual level, because of legal and inner constraints. This limitation influences the 
subjectification of drug reps, who continue to represent themselves as ‘non-ordinary’ salesmen.  
 
When analysing the rationalisation of the new institutional logic, everything appears to develop 
through, and according to, hierarchical strata. Nevertheless, it appears that the consumer goods 
industry logic stops at the zone level in the organisational structure, the regional actors (regional 
directors and drug representatives) being maintained on a logic of ethical pharmacy. At a regional 
level,  turnover  remains  the  main  criterion  for  measuring  output,  and  profit  is  not  measured 
individually. 
What is measured in your job? The number of boxes sold. We look at ratios in France. They look at 
the average daily contact rate. Do they look at profits? No, never. They look at overall turnover, but 
the margin is analysed at a much higher level. We are not interested in that at our level. Even in the 
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As far as assessment techniques are concerned, turnover rather than any calculated margin also 
remains the main criterion on which quarterly bonuses (the most important ones for drug reps) are 
based. 
Turnover remains the essential basis for calculating bonuses. (Felix, Drug Representative, Antalgyx) 
The management of sales administration confirms that the regional actors are still assessed on the 
volume of turnover they generate.  
For the time being, the regions are not yet considered as profit centres. Regional directors control 
nothing in general. We simply say to them: “You have to increase your sales turnover.” (Robert, 
Director of Sales Administration, Antalgyx) 
It thus appears that the regions constitute revenue centres, while the accountability principles of the 
consumer goods logic would create profit centres at this level. 
To understand this decoupling phenomenon between idealised and real accountability principles, 
two  types  of  explanations  may  be  put  forward:  legal  constraints  and  intra-organizational 
management choices.  
Because  of  legal  constraints,  profit  targets  or  profit-based  bonuses  remain  ideals  and  are  not 
materialised in day-to-day practices. 
Things are increasingly quantified; we have really clear objectives. But this is all hidden, because 
officially, we are not allowed to have sales objectives and bonuses based on them. We discuss these 
things in seminars but we have no documents on it. It is not published. It remains confidential. (Felix, 
Drug Representative, Antalgyx) 
The legal constraints limiting the use of individual performance measurements tend to maintain the 
ethical pharmacy logic as far as it concerns accountability principles.  
Another  reason,  related  to  intra-organizational  management  choices,  can  be  put  forward  with 
respect to the only partial implementation of the accountability principles of the consumer goods 
logic: business drivers differ highly between the two sectors. In the ethical pharmacy sector, costs 
actually remain minimal in comparison with generated turnover. Therefore, senior management 
may wish to maintain opacity with regard to the margins generated for political reasons. Disclosing 
margins inside the organisation would make the irrationality of margin metrics obvious in a world 
where these are far from being under any threat. By being made aware of the notion of margin, drug 
representatives could lose sight of turnover and simply feel demotivated. 
Management control certainly knows the costs. I know this is important. Maybe morally, the margin is 
not communicated because it is not respectable… it could shock some people! With healthcare, there 
are always things left unsaid concerning money. At the same time, the fact that we don’t know the 
profit margins allows them to say that things are not working, to put pressure on us, even if there is a 
huge margin behind. You will never find any documents here concerning production prices (Felix, 
Drug Representative, Antalgyx) 
For  all  these  reasons,  and  regardless  of  the  rise  in  the  consumer  goods  logic  amongst 
pharmaceutical sales forces, drug reps do not identify themselves as “ordinary” sellers. 
A drug representative is different from a classical salesman because there is no purchase order. For 
us,  everything  is  based  on  a  moral  contract.  It  is  solely  relational.  (Felix,  Drug  Representative, 
Antalgyx) 
 
To conclude, with respect to this third aspect of MCS, the development of new accountability 
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above.  The  new  ideal  is  echoed  in  the  discourses  and  techniques  already  in  use.  Performance 
measurement  and  remuneration  techniques  structure  the  behaviours  of  the  representatives  by 
dictating what means can be solicited in performing their activity. The transparency and the framing 
with regard to these means bring to mind the constrained autonomy of the retail seller. However, 
once again, the process of institutionalisation is halted at the internalisation stage. Both legal and 
inner constraints tend to prevent this process of institutionalisation from being completed. 
6. Discussion 
This  case  study  has  enabled  us  to  establish  various  findings  linked  to  an  untidy  process  of 
institutionalisation  (see  Table  4).  An  ideal  of  replication  rather  than  innovation  is  developing 
through product portfolio management techniques as well as through techniques for assessing the 
profitability  of  promotional  operations.  The  consumer  goods  industry  logic  is  also  slowly 
transforming the division of power amongst the departments. Although drug representation may not 
be envisaged in the same way as retail selling, the image of the drug representative as a scientific 
informant,  fostered  by  an  ambiguous  status,  is  tending  to  give  way  to  an  image  of  the  drug 
representative as merely a seller. This is reinforced by accountability principles inspired by those 
structuring  the  profit-driven  activity  of  the  consumer  goods  seller.  However,  to  complete  the 
process  of  institutionalisation,  the  new  institutional  logic  still  has  to  be  appropriated  by  the 
individuals  themselves.  On  this  point,  we  observe  that  the  problematic  of  profitability,  a  key 
element in the consumer goods industry logic, is only partially developed along the sales force line. 
In addition, management controllers, despite being vectors of this logic, are held at arm’s length 
from  operational  managers.  In  contrast,  the  new  management  culture  based  on  marketing 
innovations (i.e. replications) is increasingly internalised. 
<<Insert Table 4 about here>> 
By using one empirical case study, this research details the process of institutionalisation by, and of, 
a MCS within one firm; in other words, how intra-organisational change develops through an MCS 
and at the same time modifies it. At Antalgyx, changes in the MCS are presented by managers as a 
means of enhancing the efficiency of the organisation. Yet in several aspects, the efficiency of the 
reforms is not clear: the changes can be better explained by institutional factors and the need to 
demonstrate that the organisation is well managed. We hypothesised that an institutional logic was 
diffusing from ideals to discourses and techniques, as theorised by Hasselbladh and Kallinikos 
(2000). However, our empirical study shows that this process is not as systematic as the theory 
suggests. Analysing the institutionalisation process of MCS shows that it can be difficult for a new 
model to be institutionalised and internalised. At Antalgyx, the institutional logic of the consumer 
goods industry plays a major role in the change in MCS. For instance, recruiting people who have 
previous experience in the consumer goods industry contributes to the importation of MCS used in 
that organisational field. Nevertheless, the logic of ethical pharmacy is not disappearing. The former 
ideals  coexist  with  the  emerging  ideals,  and  systems  of  control  tend  to  remain  very  stable 
(Granlund, 2001): changing the profile of controllers and the tools of control does not suffice to 
change the way the managers are controlled. The case suggests that “logic transposition” is an 
important mechanism of institutional change (Djelic and Ainamo, 2005) but it also confirms that 
“institutionalization  does  not  occur  through  the  simple  imitation  of  an  action  by  immediate 
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A combination of MCS including cultural, behavioural and output controls has been investigated 
(Merchant and Van der Stede, 2003). More precisely, three elements of the control mix, i.e. the 
management culture, the division of power amongst departments and the accountability principles, 
have been observed (Abernethy and Chua, 1996). By analysing in detail the various facets of MCS, 
different levels of change have been diagnosed.  
The most widely accepted element of the changing MCS is the new management culture. It is 
presented as consistent with the existing ideal of innovation. It is thus possible for this new ideal to 
be incorporated in the discourses and, at least partly, internalised by the actors. This can be a way to 
change by evolution (Burns and Vaivio, 2001; Siti-Nabiha and Scapens, 2005).  
Concerning the second aspect of MCS—i.e. the redistribution of power, the diffusion of the ideal of 
the consumer goods industry appears difficult: it would dramatically reduce the importance of the 
currently dominating coalition. Salespeople and their managers do not want to hear about it, and if 
they do, they hush it up and transform it into a taboo subject for all actors, developing a “non-
discourse”  on  the  topic.  The  other  departments  prefer  to  remain  discrete  and  evoke  it  very 
indirectly, since they feel that speaking out would jeopardise the process of change. Blockages 
notably occur, because of actors’ resistance to change (Siti-Nabiha and Scapens, 2005) and because 
of their poly-rationality (Quattrone and Hopper, 2001). As previously shown (Townley, 1997; Basu 
et al., 1999; Bhimani, 2003; Major and Hopper, 2005; Siti-Nabiha and Scapens, 2005), the ability 
of the internal coalitions to resist the new logic explains, at least partly, their acceptance or refusal 
to  internalise  the  new  MCS.  Here,  decoupling  stems  from  resistance  to  change:  it  is  not  an 
organisational response to external pressures (Siti-Nabiha and Scapens, 2005). 
Finally, the new ideal relating to accountability principles seems to be already widely developed 
into discourses and techniques, because the existing assessment techniques in the pharmaceutical 
industry are ambiguous and can easily be used in coherence with the new philosophy. Yet both 
legal constraints and political reasons, in the end, prevent the management from following the new 
trend fully. These managerial choices betray hesitations concerning the real desire to diffuse a new 
institutional logic. The choice not to disseminate fully a consumer goods industry logic to the most 
operational  levels  may  be  explained  by  the  fact  that  managers  realise  there  is  a  contradiction 
between the principles that guide this logic and the true “business drivers” of the pharmaceutical 
sector. By making only the highest spheres of the hierarchy aware, senior management is conveying 
an  ambiguous  message—the  key  to  decoupling—that  shows  externally  that  these  questions  are 
strategic whilst maintaining the habitual modalities of running the company at the operational level. 
This  situation  illustrates  the  analysis  of  a  decoupling  phenomenon  as  presented  by  Meyer  and 
Rowan (1977). 
Considering the various degrees to which the three elements of the MCS are institutionalised, we 
show  that  change  may  be  slowly  implemented,  rejected  by  actors,  or  ceremonially  accepted 
depending on the element of the MCS under consideration. It is usually postulated that discourses 
are more easily institutionalised if they are coherent and structured (Phillips et al., 2004). Contrary 
to this assumption, our study demonstrates that a new ideal seems to have more chance of being 
developed into discourses and/or techniques when it is sufficiently ambiguous to appear as non-
conflicting with the former ideal, leading to situations of loose coupling. Discourses that conflict 
with ideals and techniques lead to decoupling, but, in a sense, also provide an opportunity for 
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institutional logic enable those who make these discourses to cope with change in the organisation 
and to rationalise a process that they do not control.    
The analysis of the institutionalisation process also suggests that, when a discourse cannot be heard, 
it can be bypassed using techniques. In fact, it seems that the ambivalence of techniques is at the 
heart of the process of institutionalisation, because it enables a priori incompatible ideals to coexist. 
Indeed, it gives the individual the necessary latitude to position himself in relation to the new 
message conveyed by the organisation. The ambivalence of techniques enables an internalisation by 
“allomorphism”, meaning that for the innovation to be internalised, it has to be “shaped to fit the 
recipient  and  reflects  all  its  institutionally  defined  differences”  (Lippi,  2000).  For  instance,  if 
activity assessment techniques do not radically change, the drug representative will be inclined to 
accept more or less consciously the new ideals that underpin them. The ambivalence of techniques 
therefore enables the consumer goods industry logic to seep into the drug representative’s daily 
practices. Moreover, the ambivalence of techniques also enables an institutionalisation based on 
hypocrisy. This hypocrisy “may provide the only chance of achieving some action without risk of 
losing general support” (Brunsson, 1993). Recruiting new profiles of management controllers and 
drug representatives can open a path towards a change in the distribution of power within the 
organisation and facilitate the progressive sharing of new rationales and routines (Busco et al., 
2006). In this case, the aim of implementing techniques is to lead an insidious institutionalisation of 
the new institutional logics when “what can be done cannot be said” (Brunsson, 1993). 
Finally, it appears that if the institutional logic of an organisational field can spread into firms 
thanks to ideals (mainly if this ideal is ambiguous), it can also be more discretely diffused by 
techniques.  The  codification  (Phillips  et  al.,  2004)  of  techniques  makes  their  diffusion  through 
organisational fields easier. The internalisation of these techniques can also be made easier by their 
ambivalence. Nevertheless, we argue that institutionalisation is completed only if ideals, discourses 
and techniques are coherent. Our empirical study shows that this is the final condition for the 
institutional logic to be totally internalised (see Figure 4). 
<<Insert Figure 4 about here>> 
We  argue  that  for  an  institutionalisation  process  to  be  fully  completed,  there  is  a  need  for 
internalisation (Kostova and Roth, 2002). When ideals, discourses and techniques do not form a 
coherent  and  linear  whole,  as  stated  above,  objectification,  i.e.  the  visible  side  of  the 
institutionalisation process, can occur. However, objectification does not exhaust institutionalisation 
(Hasselbladh  and  Kallinikos,  2000).  Indeed,  when  ideals,  discourses  and  techniques  are  not 
coherent, subjectification, i.e. the invisible side of the institutionalisation process, is hindered. A 
more  invisible  side  of  institutionalisation  lies  in  the  internalisation  of  the  new  rationales  by 
organisational actors, meaning the way actors understand their roles and enact them according to, 
against, or regardless of these new rationales. 
7. Conclusion 
To conclude, our intention was to analyse one example of intra-organisational change by detailing 
the institutionalisation process of new MCS within one firm. With this in mind, we have studied the 
impact of the diffusion of the consumer goods industry logic on the MCS of an organisation in the 
ethical pharmacy sector. To go beyond criticism levelled at the neo-institutional school of thought, 
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framework proposed by Hasselbladh and Kallinikos (2000). The case study presented here is used 
as additional empirical evidence to generate theory about institutionalisation and decoupling. This 
paper  not  only  explores  how  the  process  of  institutionalisation  takes  place  but  also  whether  it 
actually takes place and, if so, to what extent. 
This research has identified signs of change in management control when confronted with a new 
institutional model. The use of the theoretical framework proposed by Hasselbladh and Kallinikos 
(2000)  offers  new  insights  into  understanding  the  decoupling  phenomenon  by  studying  the 
institutionalisation  process  through  ideals,  discourses  and  techniques.  Decoupling  is  usually 
considered as the result (maybe unconscious) of an organisational choice not to entirely implement 
the new technique inside the organisation, as traditional NIS scholars argue (Meyer and Rowan, 
1977), or as the result of resistance to change (Siti-Nabiha and Scapens, 2005). Our empirical 
findings  call  into  question  the  systematic  as  well  as  the  linear  nature  of  this  process.  Ideals, 
discourses and techniques do not naturally translate from one to another: decoupling appears when 
there is no coherence between them. Moreover, we argue that ambiguous ideals and ambivalent 
techniques may facilitate the implementation and the internalisation of a new institutional logic in a 
given organisation. 
These findings have several implications for future research. They invite us to analyse change in 
MCS in relation to the stability of practices and to the ambivalence of control devices. 
This  paper  revisits  the  centrality  of  discourse  underlined  in  postmodernism  and  organisational 
research (Alvesson and Deetz, 1996). Building on a Foucauldian approach to discourses (Foucault, 
1975,  1980),  we  have  shown  how  discourses  contribute  to  producing  particular  forms  of 
subjectivity according to, in resistance to, or independently of, changing power techniques and 
evolving ideals. We have confirmed that discourse is central to the institutionalisation process. It is 
central to change because it not only “ties together ideals and systems of measurement and control” 
(Hasselbladh  and  Kallinikos,  2000,  p.706),  but  also  structures  the  individual’s  subjectivity, 
“providing him/her with a particular social identity and way of being in the world” (Alvesson and 
Deetz,  1996).  We  have  actually  highlighted  empirically  how  discourses  that  conflict  with  new 
ideals and techniques enable actors to cope with the evolution of their organisational field and find 
their way in their organisation.  
Therefore, change seems able to develop only if some practices (such as the roles envisaged by 
organisational actors) remain stable. Furthermore, this research concludes that change can build on 
the  ambivalence  of  ideals  and  techniques.  As  stated  before,  the  ambivalence  of  ideals  and 
techniques enables change to diffuse gradually and disseminate into organisational actors’ daily 
practices. Internalising norms, the ultimate stage in institutionalisation, is thus facilitated. For these 
reasons, it seems fruitful to import perspectives offered by research on properties and on the impact 
of technology to understand the institutionalisation of norms. This research suggests that change can 
be better analysed when crossed with research about accounting as a socio-institutional practice 
(Hopwood and Miller, 1994; Townley, 1995; Jeacle, 2003). In order to analyse changes in MCS 
further, we propose to explore the socio-institutional processes through which MCS is internalised 
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Concepts  Definitions  Characteristics  Application in Organisation 
Ideals  Basic ideas  Expressed vaguely, in a 
wholesale fashion 
Narrative description of the 
importance of realising positive 
work control 
Discourses 
Ways of defining and 
acting upon reality 
 
Discourse achieves both a kind 
of closure in the significative 
content or meaning of ideals and 
the specification of the relations 
and items involved 
Discourse on human resource 
management that delineates in 
considerable detail relationships, 
social roles and rules of conduct 
Techniques 
of control 
Elaborate systems of 
measurement and 
documentation for 
controlling action outcome 
Are usually expressed in 
numerical or other forms of 
codification  
Development of various systems 
of classification and 
measurement 
Table 1 – The Institutionalisation Process: Ideals, Discourses and Techniques of Control (adapted from 
Hasselbladh and Kallinikos, 2000) 
 
 
Antalgyx  Position Title 
Marc  Sales Efficiency Supervisor 
Robert  Sales Administrator 
Pascal  Sales Director  
Donald  Zone Manager  
Julien  Regional Manager 
Felix  Drug Representative 
Maud  Drug Representative 
Alexandre  Management Controller BU 
Arnaud  Assistant Management Controller BU 
Matthieu  Management Controller BU 
Cyril  Management Controller BU 
Alain  IT Project Supervisor 
Annabelle  Consolidation Supervisor 
Table 2– Representation of the Population Interviewed at Antalgyx 
 
  Control mix 
   Management 
Culture 
Division of Power amongst 
Departments 
Accountability Principles 
Ideals  “Mission” of the 
industry 
Dominant department or coalition of 
departments, or said to be so in the 
industry. 
Privileged Object to be controlled 




Attributes of the dominant department, 
signs of power, privileges in the 
organisation 
Role of Management. Mission of 
middle managers and operating core 
Techniques  Marketing 
Techniques 
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  Management Culture  Distribution of Power  Accountability Principles 
Ideals  Ambiguous 
A perverted conception of 




Shift towards a bypassing of 
both the doctor and the drug 
rep 
Conflicting 
Promotion of a more 
managerial conception of 
accountability (seller side vs 
scientific side of the drug 
rep’s job) 
Discourse  In discourse, profitability is 
either a means or an end 
depending on the target 
audience  
The dominant department 
clearly remains the sales 
department 
Discourse requiring a 
greater level of commercial 
efficiency from drug 
representative is developed 
Techniques  Marketing techniques 
designed to satisfy new 
replication concerns (e.g. 
profit measurement of 
promotional operations) 
Recruitment of “less scientific 
profiles” in the sales and 
marketing departments. 
Recruitment of management 
controllers from the consumer 
goods industry as vectors for 
change 
Performance measurement 
and remuneration system 
become increasingly similar 
to the one used in the 
consumer goods industry 
(behaviour-based added to 
result-based assessment)  
Internalisation  Loose coupling 
Techniques are partly used 
in a ceremonial way but they 
seem to be increasingly 
accepted 
Decoupling 
Sales department retains the 
right to have the final say in 
the decision-making process 
Decoupling 
Decoupling is maintained 
because of both legal and 
organisational culture 
constraints  
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Figure 1– Stages of Institutionalisation (inspired from Hasselbladh and Kallinikos, 2000) 
 
 
Figure 2- Traditional Institutional Logic of Ethical Pharmacy in France 
 
 
Figure 3- Traditional Institutional Logic of Consumer Goods Industry 
Figure 4 – Full Institutionalisation as a Result of Coherent Ideals, Discourses and Techniques   
New Ideals 
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